TRANSFORMATION OF THE UN’S ROLE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM: A THEORETICAL-LEGAL APPROACH AND INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES

Abstract

The article examines how the United Nations has transformed from a post-war coordinator of reconstruction into the central node of a multi-level system of global economic governance. Adopting a theoretical-legal perspective, it explains how UN institution sespecially ECOSOC, UNCTAD, and UNDP generate norms, standards, and procedural routines that align national, regional, and multilateral policies with the 2030 Agenda. The analysis clarifies the dual legal nature of contemporary governance: soft-law instruments that diffuse expectations and practices, and hard obligations that arise through reporting mandates, budgetary conditionality, and treaty-based commitments. By organizing fora that bring together states, IFIs, firms, and civil society, the UN reduces coordination failures, lowers transaction costs, and provides legitimacy for joint action on trade, finance, climate, digitalization, and social policy. At the same time, the paper highlights institutional challenges overlapping mandates, fragmented accountability, asymmetric voice for developing economies, and uneven implementation capacity across agencies and regions. To address these frictions, the study outlines design principles for reform: mandate consolidation around measurable outcomes; interoperable data, taxonomies, and disclosure regimes that link sustainability reporting to investment decisions; structured cooperation with the IMF, World Bank, and WTO; and incentive-compatible funding that rewards verifiable development impact. Taken together, these elements depict a UN that is evolving from a convener into a results-oriented orchestrator: one that embeds sustainability norms into market rules, connects finance to development priorities, and strengthens the predictability and fairness of the global economy, while preserving inclusiveness and state ownership of policy choices. The discussion refrains from evaluating outcomes, focusing instead on the scope, logic, and instruments of UN coordination. It maps how agenda-setting, standard-setting, capacity building, and technical assistance interact as complementary channels through which the UN steers expectations and aligns incentives without centralized command. It also shows how monitoring and peer-review practices cultivate reputational pressures that, over time, approximate compliance even in the absence of coercive authority. Finally, the article situates the UN within a polycentric order in which regional bodies and the G20 shape priorities; in this setting, the UN’s comparative advantage lies in legitimacy, inclusiveness, and rule-crafting that translate common values into operational guidance for public and private actors.